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Interpretations of MPA Winners and Losers: A Case 
Study of the Cabo De Palos- Islas Hormigas Fisheries 
Reserve 
"The first lesson learned by any fisheries manager is that all conservation decisions are also allocation 
decisions, i.e., it is almost impossible to find a measure for conserving fish stocks that does not 
benefit some resource users more than others." (Nielsen et al. 2004:157) 
Abstract 
There is a controversy in the literature on marine protected areas (MPAs) over the way their 
outcomes are portrayed in terms of winners and losers. On the one hand, many analysts 
have portrayed MPAs as win-win solutions, resulting in both increased biodiversity and 
improved livelihoods. On the other hand, some analysts have argued that win-win outcomes 
are mythical, and in practice, MPAs invariably result in trade-offs between ecological and 
economic objectives. This study seeks to test which of these two hypotheses fits the Cabo de 
Palos Islas-Hormigas marine protected area (CPH-MPA) in southeast Spain. However, it does 
so not by analysing directly the tension between the two objectives of ecological and 
economic goals, but by analysing the tensions between four groups of stakeholders – fishers, 
divers, community residents, and administrators – which map on to the tension between the 
two goals. The study is based on 111 interviews of key informants conducted in 2013-2014 
to discover the perceptions of stakeholders on the issue of who are the winners and who are 
the losers as a result of the MPA. The main findings of this study on the CPH-MPA are that 
winning and losing are very complex and ambiguous categories; that there is no objective 
way of determining who are winners or losers; that the situation of winners and losers is due 
to human intervention rather than a natural and inevitable process; that win-win outcomes 
are implausible because trade-offs between wins and losses are inevitable; and that political 
authorities have to decide who will be the winners and who will be the losers.  
Key words: marine protected area; social impacts; win-win; winners; losers 
Introduction 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are often advocated on grounds that they bring about win-
win outcomes in that they increase biodiversity (ecological win) and at the same time 
improve livelihoods (economic win). Because of the well-documented positive ecological 
impacts of some MPAs, they are frequently portrayed by their advocates as win-win 
strategies for biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation (Roberts et al. 2001; Leisher 
et al. 2007; Jones 2014b). However, as Mascia et al. (2017) note, the social impact of MPAs is 
much less understood than the ecological impact, and a growing body of researchers are 
questioning the win-win scenario claimed by advocates of MPAs, arguing that most MPAs do 
not produce win-win outcomes, but trade-offs between wins and losses (Christie 2004; 
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McShane and Wells 2004; Cheung and Sumaila 2008; McShane et al. 2011; Segi 2014; 
Chaigneau and Brown 2016). These assertions imply a zero-sum interpretation (rather than 
the variable sum of win-win) of crowded sea areas such as MPAs wherein one group’s gain is 
at another group’s expense (Flannery et al. 2016). For example, some critics suggest that 
many MPAs place the health of biodiversity above the welfare of the communities 
dependent on these natural resources (Mascia 2004; West et al. 2006; Fabinyi 2008; Mascia 
and Claus 2009; Mascia et al. 2010; Bennett and Dearden 2014), indicating a win-lose 
outcome (Chaigneau & Brown  2016: 36;  McShane et al.  2011: 967). Some researchers 
claim that by focusing on the pursuit of win-win at the aggregative scale of ecological and 
economic outcomes, studies may overlook losses at the disaggregated scale of marginalised 
groups and individuals. For example, Daw et al (2015) say that trade-offs in ecosystem 
services are very complex and diverse, and that negative trade-offs may be ignored by 
looking at the bigger picture, especially if disadvantaged people who suffer the losses have 
no voice in decision-making.   
The aim of the current study is to examine the Cabo de Palos Islas-Hormigas marine 
protected area (CPH-MPA) in southeast Spain to find out which one of these two 
interpretations – win-win or win-lose - fits it best. Ecological studies show the CPH-MPA to 
be an ecological success story in that protection has resulted in an increase in the 
abundance and biomass of numerous commercially important species, and a recovery of the 
marine ecosystem (García-Charton et al. 2004; Felix-Hackradt et al. 2013; Hackradt et al. 
2014). However, the reason why the CPH-MPA was chosen for this study is because, while it 
has conserved marine resources, it has not been successful in meeting its socio-economic 
objectives (Hogg et al. 2017; Hogg et al. 2018). Originally established as a reserve to protect 
the future of artisanal fishing, the CPH-MPA has attracted a huge number of recreational 
scuba divers who have come to dominate the area, making artisanal fishing increasingly 
difficult- a pattern seen in other Spanish MPAs (Jentoft et al. 2012). The result has been 
tension not only between fishers and divers, but also between them, the local community, 
and management, with scientists and NGOs expressing concern about the environmental 
impact of increasing exploitation of marine resources. This marine reserve is an ideal case 
for applying the concept of winners and losers because of the perceived injustices of the 
changes in fortune experienced by stakeholders. The paper challenges the win-win discourse 
and highlights the need for conservationists to be more explicit about the losses, costs and 
hard choices that occur at the time of MPA implementation and changes over time, so they 
can be openly discussed and honestly negotiated. Doing so is essential to prevent dashed 
expectations and unresolved conflicts from arising (McShane et al. 2011; Segi 2014; 
Chaigneau and Brown 2016). 
We have followed Cinner et al. (2014) in measuring wins and losses by the subjective 
perceptions expressed by the stakeholders (though they also use objective metrics). 
Perceptions, defined as expressing people’s thoughts about situations or policies (Bennett 
2016), are subjective; socially constructed; and reflective of people’s backgrounds and 
circumstances. We have widened the scope of winners and losers to include not only 
resource users (fishers and dive operators) but also community members and 
administrators, since they are also closely engaged with the MPA. However, we recognise 
that these are not homogenous stakeholder groups but comprise individuals with diverse 
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and complex particular identities (Voyer et al. 2015). We have used open-ended, rather than 
closed questions in asking respondents for their assessments of winning and losing, to 
enable us to tap into a wider range of perceptions of winners and losers. Finally, we have 
adopted O’Brien & Leichenko’s (2003) theoretical framework of winners and losers (see next 
section), which has given our study of winners and losers a deeper foundation.  
In the following section, we outline the theoretical framework that underpins the paper. We 
then describe the background to the case study of CPH-MPA. This is followed by an 
explanation of the qualitative methodology used in the study. We then present the results of 
the data obtained on winners and losers in the CPH-MPA and discuss these results. In the 
final section we conclude with a summary of our findings.  
Theoretical framework 
The most impressive attempt to provide a theoretical framework for winners and losers 
analysis is that of O’Brien & Leichenko (2003:90), summarised in Table 1, who have 
developed a four-point model and applied it to economic globalisation and climate change. 
First, they define winners as those who gain something, and losers as those who experience 
some disadvantage.  In the case of marine reserves, wins and losses are generally scored on 
access to marine spaces; catches of marine resources; livelihood outcomes; participation in 
management decision-making; efficiency of management; enforcement of regulations; 
environmental footprints; socio-economic contribution to the community; and group 
organisation and solidarity (Mascia 2004; Mascia et al. 2010). Second, O’Brien and Leichenko 
distinguish between absolute and relative forms of winning and losing: absolute wins and 
losses are based on comparisons between one’s own current and past situation; whereas 
relative wins and losses are based on comparisons between one person’s situation and 
another person’s situation. Third, O’Brien and Leichenko differentiate between external and 
internal judgements of winning and losing: external judgements come from other people, 
whereas internal judgements come from oneself. Fourth, O’Brien and Leichenko distinguish 
between a ‘natural’ and a ‘social’ explanation of winners and losers. The natural theory 
holds that winners and losers are “natural, inevitable, and evolutionary” (NIE), whereas the 
“socially and politically generated” (SPG) theory holds that winners and losers are created by 
management processes that benefit some at the expense of others (O'Brien and Leichenko 
2003:93). We add a fifth point about winners and losers – that they can be conceived in 
terms of either a zero sum game or a variable sum game. A zero sum game is where winners 
can only gain at the expense of losers: one group’s gain necessarily entails another group’s 
loss. A variable sum game is where all groups can gain or lose simultaneously. What follows 
is informed by this five-point model of winners and losers.  
It should be noted that in this model, wins and losses are not always commensurate or 
quantitatively comparable. For example, a fisher’s loss of access to fishing grounds might be 
a loss of livelihood, whereas a diver’s corresponding gain of access might be a more 
pleasurable recreational experience. Daw et al. (2015) note that some trade-offs may be 
between sacred and secular values, which seem inherently incommensurable, and though 
some attempt might be made to compare them on a sophisticated scale of human well-
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being, our data are too coarse to attempt such calculations (Breslow et al. 2018). It should 
also be noted that in this case study, winners and losers are not individualised, but 
characterised in terms of groups, such as fishers and divers. Daw et al. (2015) argue that 
ideally, trade-offs should be calculated at the individual level, since different members of the 
same group might well experience different impacts on their well-being from the same 
deprivation (see also Daw et al. (2011) and Breslow et al. (2018). Again, however, our data 
are not sufficiently fine-grained to drill down to individual metrics. 
Case Study Background  
Study area 
Cabo de Palos is a small-scale fishing village in the south east of Spain, founded in the 1800s. 
The origin of the village is historically linked to the fishing industry. Until the 1960s, the 
village had no electricity or running water, but today the village is surrounded by a 
developed tourist area to the north (La Manga and Mar Menor) and an industrial area to the 
south (Escombreras). Considered a biogeographic frontier, CPH-MPA is home to species 
from the Mediterranean sea as well as the Atlantic (Rossi et al. 2014), which, along with its 
unique geomorphology of being a narrow continental shelf formed by a series of sea hills 
and islets, has created a biodiversity hotspot (Calvín-Calvo et al. 1998). 
The CPH-MPA  
In 1995, the Spanish government established the CPH-MPA (Fig.1.), which covers 19km2. 
MPAs in Spain come in three different forms: protected areas (PA); marine reserves (MR); 
and marine reserves of fisheries interest (MRFI). CPH-MPA is an MRFI whose objective is to 
protect, regenerate and develop fishing resources to maintain sustainable fisheries, enabling 
artisanal fishermen in the area to preserve their traditional way of life, and to support other 
low-impact activities (for example scuba-diving and environmental education) that 
contribute to economic development (BOE 2010). The management responsibility is divided 
along the territorial baseline between the National Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Environment and the Council of Agriculture and Water of the Region of Murcia. 
Studies show that over time, protection of the reserve has resulted in environmental wins 
through an increase in the abundance and biomass of numerous commercially important 
species, and a recovery of the marine ecosystem (García-Charton et al. 2004; Felix-Hackradt 
et al. 2013; Hackradt et al. 2014). The village maintains a small but declining artisanal fishing 
fleet: since 1993 to the time of study the fleet has more than halved (BOE 2010). A local 
property rights system exists excluding external fishers, and only fishers operating for four 
years before the marine reserve order of 1995 were granted access. The system does not 
permit the addition of any new vessels to the census or the transfer of licences between 
vessels, so if a vessel is no longer seaworthy and a new boat is purchased, that fisher is not 
permitted to continue fishing in the reserve with the newly acquired vessel- the licence 
belongs to the vessel. If the boat is retired, the licence is lost, though another individual may 
buy a licenced boat and use it to fish in the reserve. The six remaining vessels provide 
employment to 13 full-time fishers, and several part-time employees (88% of whom were 
born in the community). The artisanal fishers from CPH-MPA belong to the second largest 
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cofradía in the region - Cartagena (54 boats). Cofradías are local non-profit corporations 
with public rights, which represent the interests of the fishing sector by serving as 
consultative organs cooperating with the authorities in managing access to fisheries 
resources and dealing with infringements of fisheries regulations (Pascual-Fernández 1999). 
During the last 10 years, the scuba diving industry has grown substantially with nine dive 
centres currently operating. The dive centres provide full-time employment to 38-40 
‘permanent’ employees, a number that increases seasonally to accommodate the peak 
season. Few of the owners or employees of the dive operations are originally from the 
community: 55% of owners and 53% of employees interviewed were from other regions in 
Spain, and 11% and 8% (respectively) were from other countries. In 2014, the daily dive 
quota was negotiated and modified: the regional ministry proposed 250 dives; fishers 
proposed 180; and dive centres proposed 420. The final quota for internal waters was set at 
300 immersions per day in peak season, reducing the actual immersion rate by 15% (BORM 
2014; García-Charton 2016). An additional dive buoy has been installed, a dive fee of €3.56 
per dive has been introduced, and other regulations such as the number of divers per boat 
and boats per buoy are in place (BORM 2014; García-Charton 2016). 
Methodology 
Data collection 
This is a qualitative study. Fieldwork was carried out during 2013-2014 involving 111 
interviews, personal observation, community meetings, and a literature review. The 
interviews were carried out using semi-structured interviews (total = 111) conducted with 17 
professional fishers, 37 full-time employees and owners of dive businesses in Cabo de Palos, 
44 community members, 3 administrators and 10 additional key informants (KIs). KIs 
included representatives from relevant research institutes, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and fisher, and dive sector union/associations.  
A preliminary literature review and field site visits revealed the key uses of the area which 
included active, passive, commercial and community uses (for example: professional and 
recreational fishing, dive tours, sailing, kayaking, beach-based recreational activities, 
research and education, conservation). A further stakeholder analysis was conducted to 
identify the key actors involved in, or directly affected by, the reserve’s governance. This 
classification was used to guide purposive and snowball sampling, focusing on: the two legal 
resource users of the marine reserve (professional fishers and commercial dive operators) 
and the other key actors involved in decision-making (Bryman 2012). Community 
respondents were chosen randomly from a community map selecting every nth house with 
the geographical limits having been determined through a mapping exercise with 
community members. Prior to fieldwork, a pilot study helped fine tune and validate the 
survey layout and question phrasing. Table 2 provides the questions asked on the current 
management of the MPA; focusing on rules and regulations; enforcement and compliance; 
perceived costs and benefits of the MPA; and how livelihoods of different groups were 
affected by the MPA. As part of a wider study, a survey questionnaire also covered issues of 
environmental change, environmental management, and social capital, and gathered 
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household and demographic information from resource users. Four trained research 
assistants along with the lead author conducted interviews in Spanish and gathered field 
notes. Observation was used in two main ways during the research period: by the lead 
author as a non-participant observer of interactions between different stakeholders; and by 
two of the other authors as participants in CPH-MPA management meetings. Three 
community validation and feedback meetings were held between 2013 and 2014, allowing 
for open discussion around key issues arising from the results; additional data to be 
collected through participative exercises; clarification of contradictory and confusing results; 
and validation and triangulation of the data. An extensive literature review was carried out 
to ground the study in recent research findings. 
Data analysis  
Audio recordings and field notes were transcribed verbatim, and professionally translated 
from Spanish to English. Responses to open-ended questions were manually coded and 
analyzed using Nvivo10® qualitative analysis software (QSR 2012). Some themes were 
considered in the light of O'Brien and Leichenko (2003)’s theory of winners and losers, but 
most codes were developed through an ‘open coding’ method (Bryman 2012). Dominant 
themes were selected through an inductive process of reading the transcripts, noting 
repeated words and themes within and between interviews, and grouping the codes 
generated into collections of similar content (Bryman 2012). Themes included: ‘gains and 
losses/ disadvantages’ with sub themes for ‘economy’, ‘biodiversity’, ‘access’, ‘competition’, 
‘comparisons to others and personal past’ ‘internal judgements’ and ‘judgement of others.’ 
Further themes were identified associated with the reasons for the gains and disadvantages 
focused mainly on: ‘different values’, differential impacts of regulations’, ‘resentment 
towards outsiders’, ‘lack of trust’, ‘change of use’, ‘political will’, ‘evidence used for 
decisions’, ‘difficulty of changing regulations’, ‘space and access’, and ‘resource misuse.’  
Results  
In the Results section, we record the perceptions expressed by four groups of respondents  – 
fishers; divers; community members; and administrators. We selected these four groups 
because they were the stakeholders most closely involved with the MPA. Where 
appropriate, perceptions of additional KIs are included. Respondents’ perceptions are 
divided into two categories – self-perceptions (i.e. internal assessments) and others’ 
perceptions (i.e. external assessments). We also record the perceptions of respondents 
about solutions to the problems raised by the existence of winners and losers in CPH-MPA. 
Table 3 provides a summary of key findings based on the theoretical framework applied.  
Perceptions of winners 
Fishers as winners  
A cofradía representative said that the MPA had been beneficial for the local fishing 
community: “Today we earn a lot of money thanks to that half-mile where neither fishermen 
nor divers can go in. It’s been proven that fish spawn there and then come out and we catch 
them. We’re very grateful for this and if there was no reserve we might not be able to fish 
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nowadays.” Many individual fishers agreed with this positive appraisal - one said: “For me 
yes, every year I have more fish.” These are statements of fishers’ own (i.e. internal) 
assessment of their improved economic situation as a result of the reserve, indicating them 
to be winners. Five (29.4%) fishers affirmed the reserve had benefited them, while eight 
(47%) perceived that the reserve had been beneficial for the marine environment, including 
fish. These perceptions reflect the SPG rather than the NIE view of winners and losers, 
because the fishers see the MPA as a politically generated construct imposed on them, not 
an inevitable result of ecological or economic forces. These fishers appear to perceive the 
situation as a variable sum outcome where everyone can win simultaneously (or at least a 
Pareto-optimal situation where no one is worse off), in that fishers are winners but no one 
else is seen as a loser.  
Eighteen (47%) divers perceived fishers to have benefitted: “More fish, more fishermen, 
more fishing I guess”; “fishermen have a nest for life”; benefits went to “Fishermen, because 
this is a fishing reserve, made for them.” One administrator said: “fishermen have benefited 
from the regulation and control of boats in the area. They now benefit from on-going fishing 
and their activity is profitable.” A researcher referred to: “an increase of fish, an increase of 
the fishing performance.” These comments from other groups (i.e. external assessment) 
largely replicate the view of fishers themselves that fishers have benefitted from the 
reserve, and reflecting the SPG viewpoint that the MPA was deliberately established to 
favour a particular group.  
Divers as winners 
Most divers (25: 65.7%) reported benefitting from the reserve. Some said they benefitted 
from the administration’s lax enforcement of regulations. For example, one diver said that 
rules: “are not exercised as they should, they are soft and we take advantage.” Such 
comments from divers indicate that on their own self-assessment they are absolute winners 
because they take full advantage of lax enforcement of regulations, and they place a light 
footprint on the reserve. They do not see their winning as inevitable (NIE) but as 
socially/politically generated (SPG) by the administration’s treatment of them. Other 
stakeholders saw divers as winners in serving their own interests. For example thirteen 
(76.5%) fishers saw divers to have benefitted, with one fisher stating: “We agreed that only 
30 people could go down daily and only until 5 in the afternoon. Now they go down when 
they want. There are zodiacs full of divers […] [The benefits go] to the diving centres - to us 
nothing!” A cofradía representative said: “can you even imagine what it means to have 
36,000 people going to the sea? In a fishing reserve! I have had many meetings with them 
and I have told them that what we actually have is a diving reserve instead of a fishing 
reserve.” Another cofradía representative said divers were favoured over fishers by the 
administration: “They don’t really take the reserve seriously because it would harm the 
tourist industry more than the fisheries sector and they are interested in preserving tourism 
because it brings more money.” These perceptions expressed by other stakeholders (i.e. 
external assessments) indicate a strong feeling that divers were winners in that they 
achieved their own self-interest at the expense of fishers. Divers are perceived as relative 
winners in comparison to fishers:  this is a conception of a zero-sum game where divers win 
at the fishers’ expense. Fishers perceive that this situation was not an inevitable result of 
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ecological or economic forces (NIE) but a consequence of the administration’s apparent 
decision (SPG) to undermine the original rationale of the MPA as a fisheries reserve and 
instead favour tourism over fishing. 
Community as winner 
Community members said the MPA: “brings activities and prestige to the town and it’s 
something we need to take care of”; “it creates jobs and it’s good for businesses. It’s been 
generally good even though many don’t agree”; “Diving tourism attracts people and that 
brings life here”; “since tourism improved and people come to dive there’s a lot more life 
even though some don’t want to admit it.” These responses indicate that community 
members see themselves as hosting a success story in the CPH-MPA, which benefits all local 
stakeholders, even if not all of them acknowledge their good fortune. This is a self- or 
internal assessment, reflecting what is regarded as a natural process of touristic economic 
development (NIE). The only other stakeholders who perceive the community as a winner 
are the divers, who pride themselves on bringing huge economic benefits to the locality. 
Twenty six (68.4%) divers claimed the marine reserve has brought untold benefit to the local 
community: “all the economic activity of the town depends […] on the environmental 
conditions of the reserve”; “If the reserve didn't work this would be a ghost town”; “In winter, 
bars and cafeterias are empty.” This is an external assessment of the community as a 
winner, benefitting from the government’s establishment of the CPH-MPA as a fisheries 
reserve (SPG), only to allow it to be virtually taken over by the divers who bring much more 
revenue than fishers. The result is thus a win for the community at the expense of the 
fishers. 
Administration as winner 
Administrators claimed their creation and management of the MPA has been a success for 
four reasons. First, the reserve benefitted artisanal fishers, as it was intended to do: 
“Because the official line of work is to support local artisanal fishermen, that’s the DNA of the 
reserves, we have surely brought benefits”; “Since the reserve has been managed, the 
fisheries in the area have improved so it has been beneficial for fishermen.” Second, 
administrators said they have curbed illegal fishing: “Well, I think we have damaged illegal 
fishermen. We have hampered the illegal actions.” Third, they held they have reduced 
excessive diving: “we have limited the uses. We can’t protect without limiting the uses, it 
would be like wasting money.” Fourth, administrators claimed they had helped preserve the 
local natural heritage: “What we try to do is to keep what’s natural and has a certain 
tradition.” This is a self- or internal assessment by the administration of themselves as a 
winner because they have promoted the interests of not only local artisanal fishers, which is 
the official rationale of the CPH-MPA, but also the divers, who benefit from some limits, and 
the wider community. This is a SPG perspective with an assertion that everyone was 
winning.  
Other stakeholders see the administration as a winner in the narrow sense of promoting its 
own financial self-interest. Fishers said: “The people in the administration have benefitted”; 
“The Autonomous Community receives many subsidies because of this sham and many 
people live on that.” This narrow characterisation of the administration as a winner is an 
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external assessment that reflects a SPG perspective with a zero sum game outcome whereby 
the administration is seen as winning at the expense of other groups.  
Perceptions about losers  
Fishers as losers 
Six (35.2%) fishers claimed they were the losers in the MPA: “Divers tell us that there is 
plenty of life but we fish less everyday”; the MPA “doesn't produce an increase of fish, it only 
imposes prohibitions on fishermen.” Fishers felt discriminated against by having strict 
regulations enforced upon them while few regulations were imposed on recreational fishers 
and illegal fishers. For example, a fisher said: “It's unfair for us because they don't let us 
work. Then illegal fishermen come with harpoons and they catch all the groupers […] they go 
with inflatable boats and spend the whole night in the Hormigas.” Fishers also said they 
were in conflict with divers over fish resources and sea space: “it's getting overcrowded”; “If 
they're diving I don’t set my net until they leave, and why can they anchor and dive if I have 
set the net? [...] we are incompatible.” Moreover, artisanal fishers were scheduled to be 
phased out of the MPA, as a cofradía representative noted:  “Only those who have 
traditionally fished in the reserve, before it became a reserve, can fish in it [...] there won’t be 
any more licenses […] If licenses disappear then it won’t have a fishing interest and there 
won’t be any fishing boats.” So the artisanal fishing groups’ self- (internal) assessment as 
losers rested on a perception of being increasingly squeezed out by divers, illegal and 
recreational fishers, as well as being phased out of the MPA by the administrators. This is a 
relative, SPG view of losing (i.e. it was not inevitable), resulting in a zero-sum game of other 
groups winning at the fishers’ expense.  
The administration acknowledged that despite the MPA’s official objective being to protect, 
regenerate and develop artisanal fishing, the current regulations do not support the long-
term protection of fishers: “There is a closed list of boats that can fish and in 10 or 20 years 
there will be no boats in the area because the fishing fleet cannot grow”; “there is no 
generational renewal, the list of authorized fishermen has been decreasing.” An NGO 
representative said: “Clearly the most important use in Cabo de Palos, if you look at 
tradition, is fisheries, and now the one with greatest prospects is tourism and diving.” These 
stakeholders’ (i.e. external) perceptions of fishers as losers reflects a relative, SPG 
perspective that fishers’ losses were due to administrative decisions, resulting in a zero sum 
game of fishers as losers and divers as winners.  
Divers as losers 
Twelve (31.5%) divers said the relentless expansion of their number was having a damaging 
effect on their diving activity, because of both over-crowding - “The quota of divers 
increases, it's not controlled [...] New licenses are granted and the areas are overexploited” - 
and benthic damage: “Divers, contribute to the impact. Divers who say we don't are lying”; 
“the more tourism there is the worse things get. The life of the reserve has gone down 
steadily.” Also, divers revealed that there was tension between diving centres (which are 
well-regulated) and diving clubs (which are not well-regulated): “A diving club has no 
obligation of including insurance, a skipper or a guide [...] sometimes they go diving with no 
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boat and we have to go and get them, these are rules they don't respect and it affects us”; 
“it's not fair that we are controlled and they are not.” Other divers said diving centres 
themselves were irresponsible: “you can see many new diving centres which are not 
respectful when diving. Those who ignore [the rules] make the best of the reserve because 
it's too tempting a candy.” A dive representative said the diving industry was anarchical, 
incapable of collective action: “everyone is after their own profit, nobody appreciates team 
work.” The dive representative also said the administration had failed to regulate the diving 
industry, and the dive industry had failed to regulate itself: “The administration should have 
regulated more but in an attempt to help the development of recreational diving it did not 
regulate. We could have regulated ourselves but the problem is that we have not.” These 
divers’ statements provide recognition of the damage inflicted on the diving experience 
itself as well as the marine environment by increasing numbers of divers, leading to a 
tragedy of the commons. The picture painted by this self- (i.e. internal) assessment is an NIE 
perspective (the inevitability of over-exploitation of resources because of unbridled 
economic expansion) leading to a variable sum game of everyone losing. 
Other stakeholders echoed the perceptions of divers themselves, that their expansion was 
undermining their own enjoyment of diving - “more and more centres are opening [...] the 
existing ones complain about the coming ones” – as well as damaging the ecosystem: “The 
divers’ exploitation doesn't allow animals to get to their place, they lack a bit of tranquillity, 
it's very overcrowded.” Administrators affirmed that: “the level of diving is somehow 
industrial. Such is the opinion of the Ministry, and the Region of Murcia knows it [...] we don’t 
fully agree with the level of diving that is taking place in the internal waters of the marine 
reserve”; “We […] want a good diving business and to make it sustainable. We don’t want to 
die out of success.” These (external) assessments from other stakeholders repeat the self-
assessments by divers themselves – that their numbers are increasing too fast for their own 
good, for the good of the MPA, and, implicitly, for the good of other groups, illustrating both 
absolute and relative losses for divers. The perspective is NIE, in that the cause of the over-
expansion is the free market, and a variable sum outcome of everyone losing.     
Community as loser  
Sixteen (36.3%) community members were critical of the impact of the MPA on their lives. 
For example, one said: “In summer there’re too many people compared with the rest of the 
year. The port resembles the underground in rush hour.” This internal or self-assessment 
expresses the regret felt by residents for the loss of their tranquillity by the arrival of a vast 
influx of divers. It implies an NIE perspective in that the cause of the community’s loss is the 
impact of the free market, the outcome of which has been a zero-sum game of divers 
winning but the community losing.  
Fishers said of diving: “It has sunk the town”; “The diving centres themselves have their own 
bars so they don't contribute to the town's economy”; “This resembles more and more the 
port of Ibiza.” These external assessments by fishers echo the internal or self-assessments of 
other community members, reinforcing the doom-laden NIE perspective and the zero sum 
outcome of the community losing because of the over-expansion of the diving industry. 
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Administration as loser 
Some administrators were frank about their own failings. For example, one administrator 
acknowledged incoherence in regional government policies: “Fisheries and tourism are at 
odds.” Another administrator attributed their failure to loss of funding: “Now, within the 
Ministry […] there are things going bad and we are going down due to lack of investment, 
politicians allow the reserve to be run with a budget that doesn’t correspond to […] the 
Directorate of Environment.” These internal or self-assessments reveal the dysfunctional 
organization that some administrators feel they are running. They reflect an SPG perspective 
in that they blame politicians for the loss of their effectiveness, and for the consequent 
variable sum outcome of everyone losing, since there is no winner mentioned.    
Many other stakeholders were extremely critical of the administration’s poor performance. 
One criticism was of its failure to enforce MPA regulations. For example, divers complained: 
“If they find illegal fishermen they do nothing”; “rules are fine but there is no control or 
sanctions.” A researcher asserted that: “no surveillance protocols have been implemented.” 
A community member alleged that people who are “fishing illegally in the reserve […] come 
here [to the restaurant] and try to sell it to us.” An NGO representative said: “the 
administrations in general can’t yet see the benefits of preservation in short and medium 
term and they fear social opposition.” The port authority representative claimed the 
administration lacked interest in enforcement: “the authorities are very passive.” A diver 
implied that corruption lay behind this failure: “governments and administration ignore 
regulations because there is much money and political interests [at stake].” Another criticism 
was about the administration’s un-integrated structure of decision-making. For example 
researchers said: “It’s not efficient, it’s chaotic [...] there is a lack of coordination because 
Cabo de Palos is partly managed by the Autonomous Community and partly by the State and 
both parties are not coordinated [...] The Ministry imposes a very restrictive quota [on diving] 
and the Autonomous Community doesn’t impose any restriction”; “Within the administration 
itself there’s a conflict between the ones who advocate for the preservation of the area and 
the ones that manage the fisheries use because they have different goals within the same 
organization.” Divers claimed there was a failure of communication: “The reserve is 
managed from two different administrations that don't talk to each other: the central and 
the autonomic administrations and within the latter, from the Fisheries department that 
doesn't talk to Environment, and Environment which has technical staff that have no idea of 
biology, which means everything is regulated arbitrarily.” These external indictments by 
other stakeholder groups of the administration for failing to enforce its own regulations and 
for having a dislocated structure of decision-making portray it as a loser in terms of its 
ineffectiveness and its loss of respect from users of the reserve. It is a SPG perspective, given 
that the blame lies in the hands of the political authorities, and it has a variable sum 
outcome of everyone losing.    
Perceptions about solutions  
In this section, we present four different ways suggested by our respondents of dealing with 
the problems raised by the presence of winners and losers in the CPH-MPA: (1) more top-
down authority; (2) more stakeholder participation; (3) more marketization; and (4) more 
autonomy for the groups. 
  12 
(1) On more top-down authority, the first solution which was put forward by all groups is for 
governmental imposition of a resolution of the tension between winners and losers (Pretty 
1995; Jones 2014a). In effect, this means choosing which side(s) are to win, and on what 
issues. For example, a diver said that the administration should be much tougher with 
divers: “The rules are not very strict, they turn a blind eye frequently. They should be more 
strict, we [diving centres] should be given warnings.” Fifteen (39.4%) divers suggested that 
the regulations controlling diving should be tightened.  
(2) On more stakeholder participation (SP), by contrast to top-down solutions, 27 (24.3%) 
respondents from all interviewed stakeholder groups recommended increasing SP in MPA 
decision-making (Pretty 1995; Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003; Gray 2005; Méndez-
Contreras et al. 2007; Pomeroy et al. 2007; Pomeroy and Andrew 2011; Voyer et al. 2015). 
For some respondents, this meant letting the people share in ruling. For example, a NGO 
representative said: “I think there is a need of more bodies with real participation.” A 
researcher said: “All the groups should be more engaged in the management.” A diver said: 
“Users of marine resources [should] take part in the management processes.” Researchers 
recommended: “establishing a mechanism of public participation and coordination between 
the actors.” For some divers, SP meant consensus: “The administration [must manage] but in 
consensus with everyone, both fishermen and diving centres.” For other respondents, it 
meant management at least taking account of users’ opinions. For example, the cofradía 
said: “they should take more into consideration the opinion of fishermen who are working 
there every day.” Even some administrators were in favour of SP: “With a greater 
involvement of the actors and a greater commitment, everything would improve a lot 
because there would be more collaboration for the regulation of the marine environment.” 
The implication here is that SP will enhance the prospect of consensual agreement on rules 
that are tolerable for most stakeholders – i.e. minimising anyone’s losses.   
(3) On more marketization, a suggested solution put forward by both fishers and divers was 
to resolve the conflict between winners and losers by monetising it – i.e. by structuring that 
relationship into a competitive economic or market system, a method that has been applied 
with varied success in other regions (Dixon et al. 1993; Mascia 2004; Fabinyi 2008; Mascia 
and Claus 2009; Segi 2014; Jones 2014a). One method of doing this recommended by a diver 
was a property rights system for dive centres based on licences and fees: “We have also 
proposed requiring a set of licenses to enter the reserve and diving fees that will be used to 
maintain the reserve and the research in it.” A cofradía representative suggested that both 
divers and fishers should pay fees: “There was a proposal to charge a small fee to diving 
clubs for every diver: 2 or 3 euros per diver so that after a year a lot of money is collected to 
help protect the reserve. If fishermen had to pay they would pay 100-200 euros per year, 
whatever is needed to protect it because we must all preserve it.” According to neo-liberal 
principles, such marketization should in the long run reach an economic equilibrium point in 
that everyone’s marginal cost would equal their marginal revenue, though poorer reserve 
users like fishers would be disadvantaged (Mascia et al. 2010; Segi 2014). 
(4) On more autonomy for the groups, the fourth solution suggested by fishers, divers, a KI 
and the wider community for resolving the tension between winners and losers was to give 
the user groups more responsibility for the management of the MPA (Pretty 1995; Campbell 
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and Vainio-Mattila 2003). If the user groups are helped to develop their capacity to take 
over management roles, so the argument runs, they will gradually and spontaneously work 
out a way to resolve conflicts between them and reach a settlement (Ostrom et al. 1999). 
For example, one diver claimed that: “If they would allow us, the diving clubs, to manage it, 
everything would be better than it is now with the civil servants.”  Several fishers and divers 
recognised that they had to work with other groups. For example, a cofradía representative 
said: “we must respect each other.” A diver said: “There must be a sense of coexistence and 
symbiosis.” A researcher said that fishers and divers were beginning to acknowledge that 
they had a lot in common: “they have realized that they have more things in common and 
they can fight together the illegal fishing. Their problem is the same: illegal fishermen, the 
wrong use of the reserve. Their interest is also the same: the good use of the reserve.”  
Discussion  
Five major themes have emerged from these respondents’ perceptions of winners and losers 
in the CPH-MPA and their perceptions of solutions to the problems caused by winning and 
losing. First, the designation of winners and losers is extremely difficult, and there is no 
objective way of measuring it (O'Brien and Leichenko 2003). This is in line with other studies 
such as Daw et al. (2011), Daw et al. (2015), Mascia et al. (2017), Breslow et al. (2018) and 
Davies et al. (2018) that do not attempt to quantify the trade-offs between winners and 
losers. In this case study, the question of who is a winner and who is a loser depends on the 
subjective judgements of both internal self-assessments and external others’ assessments. A 
further complexity is that tension between winners and losers was evident not only between 
groups but also within groups, as found in previous research (Fabinyi 2008; Mascia et al. 
2010). For example, among divers, there was keen competition between diving centres and 
diving clubs, and between diving centres themselves; while within the fishers’ ranks there 
was conflict between artisanal, illegal, and recreational fishers. So while a group may be 
designated a winner, various sub-groups of that group may be designated as losers, and 
vice-versa. 
Second, a striking feature of the results is the perception that a group may be 
simultaneously both a winner and a loser – i.e., a winner in some respects but a loser in 
other respects. For example, some artisanal fishers saw their catches increasing in absolute 
terms, but their access to the reserve decreasing relative to divers’ access, a pattern 
reflected in other Spanish case studies (Jentoft et al. 2012). This perception is expressed in 
both self-assessments and external assessments: groups typically judge both themselves and 
other groups as simultaneously winners and losers. Some assessments may have had a 
tactical element in them (O'Brien and Leichenko 2003; McShane et al. 2011). For example, 
some fishers and divers may have designated themselves as winners rather than losers or 
vice versa in order to put pressure on the administration (O'Brien and Leichenko 2003). 
Nevertheless, perceiving oneself and/or others as simultaneously both winner and loser 
implies that there is no such thing as a ‘pure’ or ‘unadulterated’ winner or loser in MPAs, but 
a mixture of wins and losses in people’s situations. So MPAs are not arenas in which 
everyone wins, or everyone loses, or a winner takes all, but where there are endless trade-
offs, resulting in partial victories and partial failures. 
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Third, many more stakeholder groups subscribed to the ‘socially and politically generated’ 
(SPG) perception than to the ‘natural, inevitable and evolutionary’ (NIE) perception of the 
creation of winners and losers. In other words, more stakeholders believed that the division 
between winners and losers was due to human intervention than to a natural and inevitable 
process (Jentoft et al. 2012; Segi 2014; Wynberg and Hauck 2014; Herrera-Racionero et al. 
2015). However, stakeholders’ perception of the source of that human action varied 
considerably. For example, some respondents’ perception of other people winning was 
attributed to the others’ cheating behaviour, and some respondents even regarded their 
own winning as a form of cheating (Sumaila et al. 2006; Slater et al. 2014). Some divers said 
that they should not be allowed to win, and criticised the administration for failing to 
enforce the regulations against them, a finding endorsed by several other studies in which 
resource users frequently acknowledged that tighter controls over them were essential for 
the long-term viability of resources and increased equity (Ostrom et al. 1999; Campbell and 
Vainio-Mattila 2003; Méndez-Contreras et al. 2007; Dimech et al. 2009; Trenouth et al. 2012; 
Abecasis et al. 2013; Yates 2014; Di Franco et al. 2016). For these divers, their winning 
benefitted from unfairness: it was not natural or justified as the outcome of an equitable 
process (NIE), but the result of an artificial system rigged by external forces in their favour 
(SPG) (McShane et al. 2011; Gustavsson et al. 2014; Schoon et al. 2015; Chaigneau and 
Brown 2016). Respondents held that managers had a responsibility to change the current 
winners and losers configuration (SPG) rather than leave it to nature (NIE). This implies that 
MPAs are necessarily instruments which help one group rather than another – i.e. political 
constructs – whether deliberately or inadvertently. However, on the crucial question of 
whether, since the CPH-MPA was originally set up to protect the artisanal fishery, 
management should favour the fishers and restrict the divers, there was no consensus. 
Fourth, some of the above points indicate encouraging signs of potential reconciliation 
between the winners and losers. Since respondents believed that the current tension was 
socially and politically generated (SPG) rather than natural, inevitable and evolutionary (NIE), 
it could be resolved by carefully crafted management, resulting in acceptable trade-offs 
between winners and losers. However, views differed sharply on what specific reforms 
would be necessary for that resolution to be achieved, and many critics would question the 
optimism of some groups that they could be trusted with the responsibility of running the 
MPA (Jones 2014a). 
Conclusion 
Our answer to the question posed in the Introduction – whether the outcome of the CPH-
MPA is win-win or a trade-off between winners and losers – is the latter. Our findings 
challenge the win-win discourse, since not everyone is perceived to win when MPAs are 
implemented. The perceptions of respondents were that groups of stakeholders 
experienced simultaneously wins and losses, the configuration of which they attributed to 
the actions (or inactions) of the administration. On this view, the notion of a simple win-win 
is a myth; the reality is a complex mix of outcomes in which various wins and losses (and 
sometimes neither wins nor losses) are experienced resulting from trade-offs which the 
government managed by design or default. On this view, MPAs are political constructs in 
  15 
which choices are made deliberately or not as to which groups win or lose in particular ways 
(or stay the same) and to particular extents.  
The concept of winners and losers is thus far more complex than it seems at first sight, 
especially when viewed through the subjective lens of stakeholder perceptions. 
Nevertheless, it is a fruitful concept for the analysis of relationships between different 
groups of stakeholders in the CPH-MPA, despite the difficulties of determining who are 
winners and who are losers, and in what respects. As (Breslow et al. 2018:17) point out, 
“indicators will never be fully comprehensive, but are meant to provide succinct insights into 
a complex system to aid in decision- making.” The winners and losers framework enables us 
to pinpoint the sources of tension between these groups, and it reveals how deep-rooted (or 
not) those tensions are, thereby providing government with valuable data for weighing up 
how to intervene in the MPA to create the trade-offs which it deems most socially and 
economically acceptable, most morally legitimate, and most ecologically sustainable. 
Moreover, the concept of winners and losers highlights the role of SP in encouraging policy-
makers to be more explicit and transparent about the choices they make in relation to 
expected wins and losses at the time of MPA implementation and subsequent development 
so they can be openly discussed and honestly negotiated. Doing so is essential to prevent 
dashed expectations and unresolved conflicts arising from limited or no SP which can lead to 
a backlash against conservation interventions (McShane et al. 2011; Chaigneau and Brown 
2016). Moreover, even if there will always be winners and losers as the sea becomes 
increasingly crowded, there is an ethical obligation on managers to minimise the disparities 
by considering the interests of all reserve users, since this is the mark of a civilised polity.  
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Table 1. Summary of Obrien & Leichenko’s (2003) framework for defining winners and 
losers.  
Defining winners and losers 
Winners Vs. Losers Winners succeed or gain something; losers experience 
disadvantages or deprivations 
Absolute Vs. Relative winners 
and losers 
Absolute wins or losses are judged based on a 
comparison of an individual’s own status/situation prior 
to a change or event; whereas relative wins and losses 
depend on comparison with the status/situation of 
others.  
Internal Vs. external judgement The concept of self-Identification, i.e. the internal 
judgement, is important to consider, since an individual 
may define themselves as a winner or loser in both 
relative and absolute terms as a result of a change, 
which may differ from the external judgement of others 
as to who has benefitted or been disadvantaged. 
Natural, Evolutionary & 
Inevitable (NIE) Vs. Socially 
politically generated (SPG) 
One theory holds that winners and losers are a natural, 
inevitable, and evolutionary (NIE) outcome of ecological 
processes; whereas a second theory suggests winners 
and losers are created through human processes (SPG) 
Zero sum Vs. Variable sum  A zero sum game is where winners can only gain at the 
expense of losers: one group’s gain necessarily entails 
another group’s loss. A variable sum game is where all 
groups can gain (or lose) simultaneously.  
 
Table 2 Questions asked to determine perceptions of winners and losers in CPH-MPA.  
Questions: 
What do you think about current management of the marine environment in 
Cabo de Palos? 
What is your opinion on how the reserve is managed? 
Are there rules that affect how people use the marine environment here? 
What are they? 
How do you feel about each of these rules? 
What is your opinion on how they are enforced? 
Do people here comply with the rules? If no why do you think people violate 
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the rules? 
Are there ways you can challenge the rules made for the reserve? 
When people enforce the rules is everybody treated the same? 
Do you see the reserve as being beneficial or not to the community? Why or 
why not? 
What impact has the implementation of the reserve had on resource users? 
What impact has the implementation of the reserve had on the wider 
community? 
Do you think the reserve benefits some users over others? Which groups, 
why?  
Do you have any suggestions on how the reserve could be managed better?  
 
Table 3: Summary of main findings  
 Internal 
perception of 
winning  
External 
perception 
of winning  
Internal 
perception of 
losing  
External 
perception of 
losing  
SP
G 
NIE 
Fishers Biological 
recovery 
Improved 
catch  
Improved 
economic 
return 
Territorial 
rights 
Biological 
recovery  
  Improved 
catch 
No biological 
recovery 
Increased 
prohibitions 
Competition 
over space 
Competition 
with illegal 
fishers 
Competition 
with other users 
Licence 
restrictions-
reducing fleet 
size 
x  
Divers Biological 
recovery 
attracts clients 
Uncontrolled 
growth of 
industry has 
been 
economically 
beneficial  
Lack of 
effective 
enforcement 
or control 
over 
numbers of 
divers  
Dive numbers 
impacting 
environmental 
health 
Competition 
within and 
between dive 
sectors 
Diver damage to 
environment 
and change in 
fish behaviour 
x  
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Community Increased 
business for 
the village – 
job creation 
Improved 
economic 
situation for 
community 
& local 
businesses 
Loss of culture 
Over-crowding 
Lack of 
circulation of 
profits within 
community 
x x 
Administrato
rs 
Biological 
recovery  
Improved 
fishers’ 
situation 
Controlled 
illegal fishing 
Protected 
cultural 
heritage 
Financial 
self-interest 
Incoherence 
between 
regulations 
Failure to 
enforce 
regulations  
Lack of 
coordination 
between 
ministries 
x  
 
 
